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Human Values in a Postmodern World
Steven L. Winter*
More than forty years ago, Maurice Merleau-Ponty identified a
philosophical fault line that continues to rumble through diverse contem-
porary debates. "Today," he proclaimed, "a humanism does not oppose
religion with an explanation of the world. It begins by becoming aware of
contingency. '  In the current period of deconstruction and other
postmodernisms, Merleau-Ponty's rejection and reconception of the
Enlightenment idea of humanism has greater resonance than ever.2 For
many, it has become a postmodern truism that "the human condition"
cannot be represented, described, or explained as just so many facts about
the world. According to the now standard (if somewhat overstated) axiom
of postmodernism, everything about humanity is socially contingent.
Reactions vary dramatically. For some, the recognition of contingency
appears to open up conceptual space for transformative politics and radical
social change. For others, however, the specter of contingency is radically
destabilizing. Because they equate social contingency with the loss of
foundations, they believe that social contingency leads inevitably from
moral relativism to nihilism. For them, the logic of this trajectory is
ineluctable. If everything is socially contingent, no social or moral system
can claim greater validity than any other. And if all such systems are
equally valid, then we are left with no reliable values, no moral standards,
and no criteria of choice. The absence of sure foundations, they are
convinced, means that we are left with an alarming and intolerable
nihilism.3
* © Steven L. Winter, 1994. All rights reserved.
1. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 241 (Richard C. McCleary trans., 1964) (lecture delivered
September 10, 1951).
2. The questions of Merleau-Ponty's influence on and relationship to postmodernism are explored
and debated in the essays collected in MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, HERMENEUTICS, AND POSTMOD-
ERNISM (Thomas W. Busch & Shaun Gallagher eds., 1992) [hereinafter BUSCH & GALLAGHER].
3. This is what Richard Bernstein calls the "Cartesian Anxiety." See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN,
BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 16-18 (1983) ("Either
there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the
forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.").
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Each of these reactions is mistaken, however, whatever the precise scope
of the social contingency claim.4 It is only a conceptual trompe l'oeil that
makes social contingency appear emancipatory.5 The lack of objective
foundations does not translate into freedom from constraint; that would be
true if and only if objective foundations were the sole form of constraint
imaginable.6 By the same token, there should be nothing disturbing in the
recognition that the problem of moral choice has proven irreducible to a set
of determinate principles or rules. It simply does not follow that we are
unable to engage in moral judgment using the tools we do have. This is,
after all, what we have been doing all along; indeed, it is what we did even
when we believed in a universal Reason.7
The crucial point is that both poles of the opposition between freedom
and determinacy assume the very same objectivist (that is, foundationalist)
premises concerning what counts as constraint. 8 In this ironic way, many
4. Martha Nussbaum wants to know what position I hold on this question. In effect, she asks: Are
there any values that, though internal to human history, are nevertheless necessary for any human
society? Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 197, 201 (1994). For an extended treatment of my view, see Steven L. Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
Focusing as I do on the centrality to cognition of embodiment and imagination, my position on the
extent of social contingency is sufficiently complex and unconventional that it does not admit of a
simple answer. Because humans start from more or less the same set of embodied, basic-level
experiences in constructing their physical, social, and moral worlds, a serious comparative study of
values is likely to reveal a pattern of relative similarity. But one consequence of the role of imagination
in human rationality is that elaborations are likely to differ across cultures with respect to specifics,
content, framing, and degree of entrenchment. Accordingly, it seems unlikely to me that concentrating
on basic human experiences such as embodiment, mortality, and the like will yield anything more than
normative family resemblances. Indeed, Nussbaum's own account of such similarities is remarkably
thin. See Martha Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE
242, 263-65 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
Let me give one example that is not merely a matter of different specifics (see id. at 256-57), but
rather turns on differences of framing. All humans need to eat and to maintain bodily integrity in order
to survive. But it is not at all clear that we can derive definite, universal norms from this fact. Fasting
is a common religious practice, as self-flagellation once was. So, too, we are familiar with the power
of the hunger strike as a tool of political struggle. There will be circumstances in which a committed
adherent can give what will be, for her, cogent reasons for pursuing a course of conduct that to others
seems aberrant and self-destructive. In such cases, we have a genuine instance of incommensurability
of values--one that indulges neither the detachment from commitment nor the rhetorical strategies of
"unrealistic goals" and "loaded dice" that Nussbaum here decries. See Nussbaum, Valuing Values,
supra, at 206.
5. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE
OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 447-50 (1989).
6. See Winter, supra note 4, at 1107-13, 1117-29; cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S
KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 229 (1990) ("[O]ne suspects that the retreat
to subjectivism or skepticism betrays a residual commitment to metaphysical realism as the only form
of truth worth having .... ); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 n.8 (1984) ("Nihilism is only a partial rejection of rationalism: The nihilist
... would argue that a rational foundation is necessary to sustain values but that no such foundation
exists or can be identified.").
7. Cf. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 203 ("What is certain is that if there is some universal
Reason we are not in on its secrets, and are in any case required to guide our lives according to our
own lights.").
8. For a discussion and critique of these shared underlying assumptions concerning reason, logic,
and the nature of concepts, see Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L.
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putative postmoderns who confidently believe that they have transcended
foundationalism remain the unwitting victims of the droll paradox I like to
call "antinomial capture." But it is both possible and desirable to escape
the distorting grip of these objectivist assumptions. To do so, we must
radically rethink the concepts of contingency, relativism, nihilism, and the
relationships between them.
My perhaps controversial claim is this: More than anything else, it is this
reconfigured understanding that characterizes the "postmodern."
Postmodernism is conventionally identified with more familiar tenets such
as the rejection of meta-narratives and the deconstruction of meaning. But
to focus on these particular elements in isolation distorts postmodernism,
leading to the mistaken conclusion that postmodernism is just a form of
radical skepticism. In contrast, as I have argued previously, these claims
must be understood en ensemble with the postmodern decentering of the
self.9 So viewed, postmodernism's most profound contribution is its
radical insistence on contingency.' °
In this essay, I say something about the origins, nature, and consequences
of this postmodern understanding of contingency. In particular, I argue that
this postmodern reconception changes fundamentally the way we think
about the problem of values. Paradoxically, my argument is that
postmodernism does not undermine values at all, but instead reinvigorates
our understanding of their deeply human dimension. Values are not to be
found elsewhere, outside ourselves and our practices; they are profoundly
human products made real by human action. Social contingency, therefore,
is the precondition for truth-not its enemy. As Merleau-Ponty observes,
"whatever truth we may have is to be gotten not in spite of but through our
historical inherence.""
This insight both undermines and overturns the logical trajectory that
supposedly runs from relativism to nihilism. Indeed, from this perspective,
the relations between relativism and objectivism are virtually inverted.
Once contingency and historicity are understood as the prerequisites for the
REV. 635, 649-61 (1990), and Winter, supra note 4, at 1117-59. The basic point about the hidden
complicity between objectivism and subjectivism was made by Merleau-Ponty as early as 1945 when
his Phenomenology of Perception first appeared. See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE PHENOMENOL-
OGY OF PERCEPTION 39 (Colin Smith trans., 1962) ("We pass from absolute objectivity to absolute
subjectivity, but this second idea is no better than the first and is upheld only against it, which means
by it. The affinity between intellectualism [i.e', idealism] and empiricism (i.e., objectivism] is thus
much less obvious and much more deeply rooted than is commonly thought."). It is only recently that
this insight and its implications have begun to take on something of the status of conventional wisdom.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 854
n.281 (1994); Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After Postmodernism?),
89 MICH. L. REV. 1549, 1562-63 (1991).
9. Steven L. Winter, For What It's Worth, 26 L. & SOC'Y REV. 789, 793-99 (1992).
10. See id. at 797-98, 811-12; see also Hugh J. Silverman, Between Merleau-Ponty and
Postmodernism, in BUSCH & GALLAGHER, supra note 2, at 143 ("Deconstruction does not deny
grounds, reasons, intelligibles, or the like. Rather it situates them.") (emphasis added).
11. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 109.
1994]
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only sort of values and knowledge we can have, it becomes clear that it is
the desire for the unattainable surety of objective foundations-and not
relativism-that creates the problem of nihilism. Nihilism thus stands
unmasked as just another artificial construct of foundationalism. Relativism
appears less a problem to be avoided than an inevitable-indeed,
indispensable-aspect of human adaptation. The obsession with objective
foundations, in contrast, looms as both nihilist and deeply antihumanist.
If there is irony in this reversal, it is fully intended. To appreciate its
logic, one must first understand how we came to the condition that many
identify as postmodernity.
One highly conventional view-associated with Lyotard, among
others-is that the postmodern is the logical outgrowth or extension of the
modern. 12  This view is consistent with a standard history in which the
genesis of modernity lies in the conflict between reason and religion. On
this familiar account, religious belief is seen as a prejudice to be overcome
because it is an obstacle to true and accurate knowledge about the world.
Accordingly, modern science begins with a healthy distrust of received
dogma and an insistence on reason and empirical proof. Applied to the
domain of values, however, the skepticism introduced by modern science
and the attendant processes of secularization proves corrosive. In the
absence of some empirical truth about human nature or some transcendental
realm of moral reality, there is no indubitable source for securing our most
cherished moral values from a disabling skepticism. The loss of faith
occasioned by science and secularization threatens a loss of sure founda-
tions. Science emerges as the only plausible candidate for truth because of
its ability to confirm itself through its own performative success.' 3 With
nothing else to secure moral justification, diverse or conflicting social
practices seem to stand beyond rational approval or condemnation.' 4
12. As Lyotard explains it, postmodernism
is undoubtedly a part of the modern. All that has been received, if only yesterday (modo, modo,
Petronious used to say), must be suspected. What space does Czanne challenge? The
Impressionists'. What object do Picasso and Braque attack? CUzanne's. What presupposition
does Duchamp break with in 1912? That which says [if] one must make a painting, [make] it
cubist. And Buren questions the other presupposition which he believes had survived untouched
by the work of Duchamp: the place of presentation of the work. In an amazing acceleration, the
generations precipitate themselves. A work can become modern only if it is first postmodem.
Postmodemism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state
is constant.
JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 79 (Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi trans., 1984). For an expression of the standard view and its relation
to postmodemism, see J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966,
1988-89 (1992).
13. See LYOTARD, supra note 12, at 46 ("But the fact remains that since performativity increases
the ability to produce proof, it also increases the ability to be right: the technical criterion, introduced
on a massive scale into scientific knowledge, cannot fail to influence the truth criterion."). On the
double sense in which Lyotard uses the term "performative," see id. at 88 n.30.
14. Cf. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 198 ("Skepticism has two sides. It means that nothing
is true, but also that nothing is false. It rejects all opinions and all behavior as absurd, but it thereby
236 [Vol. 6: 233
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Relativism appears identical to nihilism. Postmodemism-with its rejection
of meta-narratives, deconstruction of meaning, and decentering of the
self-looks like a radicalized version of skepticism that threatens a
frightening descent into intellectual and moral chaos.
In his Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor offers a different account of
modernity that in turn suggests a different explanation of our current
situation. Taylor diagnoses the crisis of modernity as arising not from the
loss, but from the expansion of moral sources. 15  Where theism had
previously dominated, the eighteenth century witnesses the emergence of
two alternative moral sources that, in a variety of ways, continue to define
our contemporary situation.' 6  The first alternative is the notion of the
dignity inherent in some conception of essential human capacities, either
rational agency or expressive subjectivity. The other is a conception of
nature as a beneficent order accessible either through reason or, in the case
of Romanticism, as it is reflected in human feelings and perceptions.
17
According to Taylor, therefore, the crisis of modernity is precipitated not
by the loss of foundations, but by a twofold loss of confidence in their
efficacy. First, the multiplicity of available moral sources leads to a loss
of certainty because the very existence of each alternative problematizes its
rivals. 18 Second, and more importantly, the newly available moral sources
suffer an inherent instability not pertinent to theism. While religion is
always vulnerable to the skeptical challenge as to truth, its acceptance at
least provides a self-sufficient ground for morality. In contrast, the
alternative moral sources of dignity and nature are subject to skeptical
challenges with respect to both validity and sufficiency. As Taylor
remarks:
[W]hereas faith can be questioned as to its truth, dignity and nature
are also called into question in respect to their adequacy if true. The
nagging question for modem theism is simply: Is there really a God?
The threat at the margin of modern non-theistic humanism is: So
what?' 9
deprives us of the means of rejecting any one as false.").
15. As Taylor explains this unconventional claim:
Our forebears were generally unruffled in their belief, because the sources they could envisage
made unbelief incredible. The big thing that has happened since is the opening of other possible
sources. In a predicament where these are plural, a lot of things look problematic that didn't
before-and not just the existence of God, but also such "unquestionable" ethical principles as that
reason ought to govern the passions.
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 313 (1989).
16. Id. at 314.
17. Id. at 314-15.
18. Id. at 317 ("Modem moral culture is one of multiple sources.... The fact that the directions
are multiple contributes to our sense of uncertainty. . . . We might say that all positions are
problematized by the fact that they exist in a field of alternatives.").
19. Id. Taylor points out that the skeptical challenge to the sufficiency of these moral sources also
entails the further question of their content:
1994]
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One way to characterize the further difficulty that afflicts these alternative
moral sources is to say that they are increasingly susceptible to "disen-
chantment," or the loss of transcendental status.
Like the standard history, this much of Taylor's account locates the roots
of contemporary anxiety over relativism and nihilism in the intellectual
transformations wrought by the Enlightenment. But this surface similarity
should not obscure the more profound differences. The shift of explanatory
focus from the loss of foundations to the expansion of moral sources
requires comparable changes in our idea of "foundations." This in turn will
oblige us to revise our conceptions of nihilism and relativism, along with
our understanding of postmodernism. To see why, we must first consider
both the way in which Taylor's account creates a problem with respect to
causation and the manner in which he responds to it.
The standard version of the Enlightenment comes equipped with its own
internal logic as a story about the advancement of reason and knowledge.
Taylor's revision of the standard history correspondingly alters the nature
of the causal account that must be given: "[T]he issue shifts from the
removal of blinkers to the question of how these new sources become
available. '20 For those who have not yet escaped objectivist premises, the
"availability" issue will not seem to be a problem at all. It will seem self-
evident to them that, in the absence of foundations, there simply are no
constraints on the possible sources of values, aside, perhaps, from the limits
of human imagination. But Taylor specifically rejects any idealist
account.2 ' Instead he insists that "it's obvious that availability here can't
mean that another quite different position is logically conceivable or even
that it is there in the tradition. In this sense, a range of pagan views, those
of the ancient philosophers, were 'available' through most of the mediaeval
and early modern periods. 22
For Taylor, therefore, the crux of any explanation of what causes new
moral sources to emerge in the eighteenth century--or, for that matter, at
any subsequent historical moment-must be located in the reflexive (he
calls it "circular") relationship between socio-economic developments and
moral culture.23 For a new moral source to become "available," it must
The challenge of inadequacy calls forth the continually renewed attempts to define what the
dignity that inheres in us as rational or expressive beings, or the good involved in our immersion
in nature, consists in. This, and not just the predicament of rivalry and contestation, is what
makes modem moral outlooks so tentative....
Id. at 317-18.
20. Id. at 313.
21. Id. at 199; see also id. at 306 ("No one really thinks that disengagement entered the culture
from the pen of Descartes, or individualism from that of Locke.").
22. Id. at 313.
23. Id. at 306.
238 [Vol. 6: 233
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"capture the spirit of a certain unreflecting practice. 2 a Changes in ways
of life and their attendant practices, routines, and behaviors alter people's
perception and understanding of what it means to live a good life.25 New
moral theories contribute to this process by thematizing, rationalizing, and
providing philosophical warrant for these emerging "life goods. 26 For a
new moral source to be perceived as compelling, therefore, it must make
sense of the modes of life that have come to dominate a given period. The
new moral sources of dignity and nature emerge in the eighteenth century
because, according to Taylor, they simultaneously illuminate and advance
contemporaneous social developments.27
Taylor's dialectical account is important in a number of ways, not least
of which is its nuanced conception of contingency. One familiar sense of
"contingency" expresses the idea of accident, uncertainty, and unpredict-
ability-what Merleau-Ponty describes as "the idea of a fundamental
element of chance in history. '28 Taylor assumes an important role for this
conception of contingency. In his account, the emergence of new moral
24. Id. at 308. As Taylor explains:
[M]oral ideals.., for the most part exist in our lives through being embedded in practices. By
'practices' I mean ... more or less any stable configuration of shared activity, whose shape is
defined by a certain pattern of dos and don'ts.. . . The way we discipline our children, greet each
other in the street, determine group decisions through voting in elections, and exchange things
through markets are all practices....
The basic relation is that ideas articulate practices .... That is, the ideas frequently arise from
attempts to formulate and bring to some conscious expression the underlying rationale of the
pattern... . A pattern can exist just in the dos and don'ts that people accept and mutually enforce,
without there being (yet) an explicit rationale. And as children, we learn some of the most
fundamental patterns at first just as such. The articulations come later.
Id. at 204.
25. See id. at 307 ("In a broad movement of culture, we see emerging new notions of and sense
of the good life: for instance, the close, loving family, or the expression of feeling, or the ideals of
benevolence.").
26. Id. at 92-93, 307; cf. NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 224 ("Philosophy justifies a belief.., by
perspicuously showing its depth and centrality in our lives.").
27. Taylor identifies some of the relevant developments and the mutually reinforcing nature of the
reflexive dynamic:
In some way, the very success of the new theologies and neo-Stoic philosophy in bringing some
stable order to the lives of important milieus in European society, along with the changes to more
effective economic and administrative practices-such as agricultural improvements, better-
disciplined armies, more effective social control-all helped to accredit the sense of living in a
well-regulated interlocking order, to which humans are attuned by their natural endowments, and
in which the pursuance of the ends of ordinary life through instrumental reason plays a central
part.... But ... [t]he relationship is plainly circular.... That is, elements of the culture were
constitutive to the developments-as, e.g., individual autonomy was for the new forms of
economic enterprise and political authority-while in return these elements were entrenched and
propagated by the forward march of these developments.
TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 306.
28. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 218. No doubt, it is this sense in which "contingency" is
understood in opposition to "necessary" or "determined" that contributes to the equation of "social
contingency" with "arbitrariness" and "indeterminacy."
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sources is made possible by more or less fortuitous changes in socio-
29economic practices.
At the same time, however, there is implicit in this "made possible"
another, very different connotation of "contingent" as dependent or
conditional. 30  For Taylor, the evolution and articulation of new moral
sources is socially contingent in the sense that they are contingent on these
socio-economic developments. Cultural conditions and practices serve as
the grounding experiences that enable, structure, and constitute the advent
of new moral sources. So understood, the most significant feature of
Taylor's account is that it recasts contingency in a foundational role.
This idea of contingency as foundational is not only different than that
of "foundations" in the objectivist sense, it is irreconcilable with it. In the
first place, Taylor's insistence on a reflexive relationship between moral
sources and cultural practices rules out the kind of fixed, unilinear relation
between base and superstructure characteristic of more traditional notions
of foundations. 3 Moreover, the idea of contingency implies some range
of non-arbitrary possibilities open to development as opposed to an
essential or necessary relation.32 (To this extent, this connotation of
contingency retains some of its traditional, analytic meaning as standing in
opposition to necessity.) This is well illustrated in the paradigm case
examined by Taylor. The forms of life that develop in the eighteenth
century in fact support three alternative conceptions of moral sources. At
the same time, however, the very idea of a reflexive relationship between
moral sources and forms of life presupposes that ideas and practices exist
29. See TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 206 ("The modem identity arose because changes in the self-
understandings connected with a wide range of practices-religious, political, economic, familial,
intellectual, artistic-converged and reinforced each other to produce it ... ").
30. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, gives this sense of "contingent" as: "Dependent
for its occurrence or character on or upon some prior occurrence or condition." III THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 825 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 8) [hereinafter OED]. This is related to the sense
in which we speak of a "contingency fund," a "contingency plan," or a "contingency clause" in a
contract. See id. at 826 (definition 9). This later usage combines both connotations; in this sense, a
contingency is "[a] thing or condition of things contingent or dependent upon an uncertain event." Id.
at 825 (definition 6). Note that in this usage, "contingency" connotes both uncertainty and determinacy,
i.e., an uncertain event the occurrence of which will determine subsequent action.
31. See TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 306.
32. Cf. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, IN PRAISE OF PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 112 (John Wild
et al. trans., 1963):
Now this working of the past against the present does not culminate in a closed universal history
or a complete system of all the possible human combinations.... Rather, it produces a table of
diverse, complex probabilities, always bound to local circumstance [and] weighted with a
coefficient of facticity.
For elaborations of this conception-what I call "nondeterminacy"-in which humanly constructed
meanings are not determinate, but are nevertheless framed and constrained by the systematic nature of
the cognitive processes, see Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); and Winter, supra note 4.
240 [Vol. 6: 233
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in relations of (mutual) constraint.33 Every moral theory is not as good
as every other, given a certain form of life. Thus, not every traditional or
logically conceivable moral vision would be meaningful or capable of
application within the social conditions of modernity.34
For those who identify postmodernism with anti-essentialism and anti-
foundationalism, this idea of contingency as constraint and foundation may
seem counterintuitive-indeed, scarcely "postmodern." I want to insist,
however, that this reconception of contingency is essential to any
understanding of the postmodern. Perhaps the most distinguishing
characteristic of postmodernism-and its most significant contribution-is
not that it radicalizes skepticism, but rather that it radicalizes our concept
of constraints.
Consider the familiar aspect of postmodernism that many find so
threatening: the attempt to decenter the conventional conception of the self
as an originary, autonomous agent by stressing its dependence on the
conventional systems of signification.3 ' The whole point of this gambit
is to explode the subject's sense of self as the self-directing author of its
practices and expose the subject as but a contingent incident of those
33. Strictly speaking, there can be no logical or temporal priority as between the grounding in
cultural practices and the interpretive frameworks that contribute to those experiences. From a
diachronic standpoint, this presents a chicken-and-egg problem. But in terms of one's synchronic
ongoing experience, it is a dynamic, reflexive, and concurrent process that might best be described as
an "epistemological ecology." See Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability, supra note 32, at
1486.
There is, however, an important sense in which the grounding experiences do have priority: for each
of us as individuals, meaning arises in the imaginative interaction with a physical and social
environment that is already formed by the actions of those who have preceded us. See MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENSE 131 (Hubert L. & Patricia A. Dreyfus trans., 1964) ("The
spirit of a society is realized, transmitted, and perceived through the cultural objects which it bestows
upon itself and in the midst of which it lives. It is there that the deposit of its practical categories is
built up, and these categories in turn suggest a way of thinking to man."). Reflecting a common
Hegelian influence, Taylor seems to agree. See TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 204, quoted in note 24,
supra. But Taylor self-consciously struggles against a tendency to stress the ideational components of
cultural development. See id. at 199-207, 305-20.
34. As Bernard Williams observes:
Many outlooks that human beings have had are not real options for us now. The life of a Bronze
Age chief or a medieval samurai are not real options for us: there is no way of living them....
Even utopian projects among a small band of enthusiasts could not reproduce that life. Still more,
the project of reenacting it on a social scale in the context of modern industrial life would involve
a vast social illusion. The prospect of removing the conditions of modem industrial life altogether
is ... another, though different, impossibility.
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 161 (1985).
35. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC (Samuel Weber trans., 1988).
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36ongoing practices. One of the principal lessons of postmodernism is that
to be a "subject" is always to be subject to multiple forms of constraint.
37
Taylor's account is helpful here because it illuminates how the
postmodem condition can actually be a matter of the multiplicity of
constraints or the proliferation of sources. As I have suggested previously,
the whole question of foundations looks quite different once one lays
rationalist presuppositions aside: from a postmodern perspective, the
predicament is not that there are no foundations but that there are too
many.38 Thus, students of postmodernity have emphasized the increasing
heterogeneity of language games, the greater mobility of the players, and
the way in which conflicting perspectives are embedded in different aspects
of our lives and activities. 39 It is the resulting profusion of meaning-and
not the "free" play, indeterminacy, or radical subjectivity thought to arise
from a loss of foundations-that leads to the problems of interpretability
and undecidability so emphasized by postmodernists.
Taylor's account is also helpful because it illuminates the twofold nature
of the process that culminates in Lyotard's famous definition of postmod-
36. See Winter, supra note 9, at 795-97. The tendency to misread postmodernism as promoting
or endorsing radical subjectivism is as unfortunate as it is common. This mistake is conspicuous in
Taylor, who otherwise is such a careful and sensitive reader. Thus, he misreads Derrida as celebrating
"the prodigious power of subjectivity to undo all the potential allegiances which might bind it; pure
untrammeled freedom" and similarly (and quite mysteriously, see infra note 37) finds "striking" in
Foucault a "kind of unrestrained, utterly self-related freedom .. " TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 489.
Much the same is true of Martha Nussbaum's misreading of Derrida and Fish on this point. See
NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 224-25. The misperception is at least mitigated in the case of Stanley Fish,
whose texts contain an inherent ambiguity that seems to invite this particular misreading. See Pierre
Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37 (1987) (arguing that
this ambiguity is built into Fish's texts).
37. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS
1972-77, at 131 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980) ("Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced only by virtue
of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power."); Jamie Boyle, Is Subjectivity
Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 COLO. L. REV. 489, 503 (1991) ("[P]ostmod-
emism... suggests there is no 'beyond.' There is no place outside the forms, no art that could break
free from the restraint in which it is, for the moment, embedded.").
38. Steven L. Winter, Without Privilege, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1068 (1991); cf. Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16
(1983) ("It is the problem of the multiplicity of meaning-the fact that never only one but always many
worlds are created by the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis-that leads at once to the imperial virtues
and the imperial mode of world maintenance.").
39. See LYOTARD, supra note 12, at xxiv-xxv, 10, 15, 66-67; Balkin, supra note 12, at 1972. As
Taylor observes, "the individual has been taken out of a rich community life and now enters instead
into a series of mobile, changing, revocable associations.. . . We end up relating to each other through
a series of partial roles." TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 502. For a thoughtful discussion of this
phenomenon and its impact on family law, see MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT
OF INTIMACY 69-76 (1993).
To test the point in one's own life, consider the abrupt shifts in attitude, demeanor, and interactions
(not to mention identity and community) that take place as one moves from office to gym to local bar.
On a larger scale, consider the very different forms of life, anticipated life goods, and associated virtues
that characterize the world of a: (1) young, urban, upwardly mobile professional; (2) middle-aged,
middle-class suburbanite; (3) blue-collar worker; (4) inner-city resident; or (5) self-employed small
businessperson. Now consider the ease with which one moves from "yuppie" to suburbanite or the way
in which the lifeworlds of inner-city residents and local business owners constantly impinge on and
clash with one another.
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ernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives. 4 ° The loss of transcen-
dence is not just a matter of progressive skepticism, but follows inexorably
from the recognition of contingency. Taylor's piercing "So what?" is not
a denial of reason or nature, but a loss of faith in their explanatory power.
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, the reconception of humanism as awareness of
contingency entails "the methodical refusal of explanations, because they
destroy the mixture we are made of and make us incomprehensible to
ourselves."'"
I want to pause on this point for a moment. It is easy to see why
someone who believes that everything about humanity is socially contingent
would conclude that neither nature nor reason can be used to generate
justifications or explanations of social life. But it may seem
counterintuitive that those, like Merleau-Ponty,4 2 who believe that our
very embodiment is central to our constitution would reach the same
conclusion. The paradox, however, is only apparent-a product of
antinomial capture. For people still ensnared in residual objectivist
assumptions, any mention of embodiment is easily mistaken for an old-
fashioned foundationalism because it seems to offer the Archimedean point
upon which to rest a system of justification. In fact, just the opposite is
true; our embodiment is the very locus of our contingency. There can be
no possibility of transcendence when our very ability to have a world is
contingent on the kinds of bodies that we have and the ways in which those
bodies interact with our physical and social environment.43 As Martha
Nussbaum points out, "the importance of context and particularity for us
40. LYOTARD, supra note 12, at xxiv ("Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as
incredulity toward metanarratives."). By "metanarrative," Lyotard means any legitimating metadiscourse
"such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or
working subject, or the creation of wealth." Id. at xxiii. Thus, although "incredulity" implies
skepticism, the way in which Lyotard defines "metanarrative" makes clear that what the postmodem
rejects is not just the truth of any particular meta-narrative, but also the very idea of a meta-narrative
as a transcendent justification.
41. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 241.
42. See MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 8, at 440-41:
In so far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which are not dependent
on my decisions and which affect my surroundings in ways I do not choose. These intentions are
general ... in the sense that they are not simply mine, they originate from other than myself, and
I am not surprised to find them in all psycho-physical subjects organized as I am.... Without
the [spontaneous evaluations given by our embodied perceptual capacities], we would not have
a world, that is a collection of things which emerge from a background of formlessness by
presenting themselves to our body as 'to be touched,' 'to be taken,' 'to be climbed over.'
43. See id. at xiii ("[W]e are through and through compounded of relationships with the world.").
As Dreyfus and Rabinow point out, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological conception of the role of
embodiment is quite general and does not say anything about the historical elaborations of those
embodied structures. HUBERT L. DREYFUS AND PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND
STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 111-12 (2d ed. 1983). Recent work in cognitive theory, in
contrast, provides quite specific accounts of the role of embodiment and of the way in which different
cultural and historical elaborations of meaning develop from those embodied structures. See GEORGE
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND
(1987); MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION,
AND REASON (1987); Winter, supra note 4, at 1129-59.
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as we are is inseparable from the fact that we are bodily finite beings of a
particular sort, beings who go through time in a particular way.""4
Because we cannot escape embodiment, we cannot evade time and
existence. We are embodied in a field of social interaction that is both our
formative context and our own ongoing production. For us, there can be
no transcendence of the contingent social contexts that are, simultaneously,
both constitutive of the self and the field of action in which the self is
always already implicated as a responsible actor.
The recognition of this ineradicable situatedness both deepens and
transforms our understanding of contingency. We are contingent beings in
the literal sense of the original Latin contingentem-"touching on all
sides. 45  We are enmeshed in contingency; we are inextricable from it.
It is this all-pervasive quality-this sense of total suffusion-that defines
the postmodern. Thus, it is quintessentially modem to treat constraint as
something to be overcome or transcended. 46 In contrast, it is characteris-
tically postmodern to understand that constraints cannot be avoided because
they provide the enabling conditions of possibility.
47
On this understanding, there can be no question of nihilism. Social
contingency does not threaten the possibility of foundations or truth; it is
their prerequisite.
Superficially considered, our inherence destroys all truth; considered
radically, it founds a new idea of truth. As long as I cling to the ideal
of an absolute spectator, of knowledge with no point of view, I can
see my situation as nothing but a source of error. But if I have once
recognized that ... [history] contains everything which can exist for
me, then my contact with the social in the finitude of my situation is
44. NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 391.
45. OED, supra note 30, at 825.
46. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 1988-89.
47. For just this reason, Nussbaum is wrong to read Fish and his postmodern cohorts as affecting
either a detachment from commitment or a divestiture of the human-including the disposition to ethical
judgment. Nussbaum, Valuing Values, supra note 4, at 204-06. Herrnstein Smith's stated position is
virtually indistinguishable from the claim that Nussbaum makes here. See Barbara H. Smith, The
Unquiet Judge: Activism without Objectivism in Law and Politics, 9 ANNALS OF SCHOLARSHIP 1 11, 117
(1992) ("It is possible, of course, to defend and promote judgments made on behalf of subordinated
people with effective non-objectivist arguments. But that is just the possibility that [Robin] West, like
many other politically concerned objectivists, fails to grasp."). And, whether one finds it persuasive
or not, Derrida clearly conceives of his project as an ethical one. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Force of
Law: The "Mystical Foundation ofAuthority," 11 CARDozo L. REV. 919, 935 (1990) (seeking "to show
why and how what is now called Deconstruction, while seeming not to 'address' the problem of justice,
has done nothing but address it, if only obliquely, unable to do so directly."). Far from denying or
suspending commitment, as Nussbaum suggests, Fish concludes his Anti-Professionalism essay by
arguing that to recognize the contingency of one's world and one's values "will in no way render that
world any less perspicuous or those values any less compelling." FISH, supra note 5, at 245-46; see
also id. at 467 ("being situated ... [means] that one's beliefs do not relax their hold because one
'knows' that they are local and not universal.").
[Vol. 6: 233
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revealed to me as the point of origin of all truth, including scientific
truth.48
Martha Nussbaum and Charles Taylor both agree that Nietzsche "did have
a real point" when he suggested that the traditional, foundational approach
to morality engenders in humanity a crippling sense of worthlessness and
a poisonous self-hatred.49 In fact, Nietzsche went further and described
it as a "fatality" which, appropriately enough, he identified as "nihilism. "50
For the problem of nihilism arises only if one demands some more secure
and objective foundation than our own contingent humanity. It is, thus, the
insistence on the objective and the absolute that is both nihilist and
profoundly antihumanist.
A true humanism, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, affirms that our values
need not be underwritten by anything more than our own contingent
actions. To the contrary: "What is perhaps proper to our time is to
disassociate humanism from the idea of a humanity fully guaranteed by
natural law, and not only reconcile consciousness of human values and
consciousness of the infrastructures which keep them in existence, but to
insist on their inseparability."'" In other words, the promise of human
values in a postmodern world is a matter of our interpretive capacity to
reappropriate and revalue our attitude toward the "human."
But, someone will quickly point out, this still leaves us with the problem
of relativism. How are we to criticize and reject social institutions such as
slavery or the subordination of women if there are no objective criteria of
moral judgment, no universal bases for moral values?52 This is the
intended import of Martha Nussbaum's second story about the three
48. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 109. Merleau-Ponty makes much the same point with
respect to skepticism:
The critique of human understanding destroys it only if we cling to the idea of a complete or
absolute understanding. If on the contrary we rid ourselves of this idea, then thought in act, as
the only possible thought, becomes the measure of all things and the equivalent of an absolute.
... At this moment, reasons for doubting become reasons for believing. The only effect of our
whole critique is to make our passions and opinions more precious by making us see that they are
our only recourse, and that we do not understand our own selves by dreaming of something
different. Then we find the fixed point we need (if we want to bring our versatility to a stop)...
in the fact that there is opinion, the appearance of the good and the true.
Id. at 206.
49. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 229, 370, 380; TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 453.
50. "Here precisely is what has become a fatality for Europe-together with the fear of man we
have also lost our love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him. The
sight of man now makes us weary-what is nihilism if it is not that?-We are weary of man."
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HOMO, Essay I, § 12 (Walter
Kaufmann trans., 1967).
51. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 226; see also FISH, supra note 5, at 239 ("[W]ithout some
institutionally articulated spaces in which actions become possible and judgments become inevitable
(because they are obligatory), there would be nothing to do and no values to support.").
52. In its most vulgar-though highly conventional-form, this concern is expressed in the fear that
relativism leads to Nazism. It is this concern that lies behind the ad hominem arguments that not so
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philosophers from developing countries who felt it necessary to invoke "the
abstract ethical language of rights, justice, equality, and personhood" in
order to develop and support their feminist positions.53  Similarly,
Anthony Cook expresses his concern that John Dewey's faith in democracy
and critical intelligence will be inadequate as a basis for meaningful
normative prescription. He worries that if actions are "evaluated by
reference to human values based in human experience, dissension will
persist."54
These are powerful concerns. So powerful, in fact, that their mere
invocation has frequently proven sufficient to stifle moral and intellectual
inquiry.55  Nonetheless, they are seriously misplaced. First, we do not
disarm ourselves against evil by relinquishing our devotion to some set of
objective moral standards that remains forever elusive and unknown.56 To
eschew such standards leaves us exactly where we are, with all the
resources of moral deliberation that constitute us and our traditions. 57
More importantly, there is real moral danger in succumbing to these
anxieties. Sincere belief in moral sources of the most transcendent kind has
never provided the least guarantee against oppression. By this I do not
mean simply that humans are perfectly capable of perpetrating atrocities in
the face of the most hallowed and widely accepted moral proscriptions
(although, for those who place their faith in external limits, that should be
sobering enough). Rather, I mean that as a historical matter, transcendent
moral values have themselves been developed and deployed in order to
sustain precisely those practices that we now want most to condemn. This
is obviously true in the case of gender relations; for much of history, the
subordination of women was justified in terms of the seemingly undeniable
natural order of things.58
53. Nussbaum, Valuing Values, supra note 4, at 198.
54. Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: Resurrecting the
Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence 41 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
55. For an account of how this played out in the 1930s and the effects it had on Pragmatism and
Legal Realism, see EDWARD PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
56. Lyotard, for instance, has made this point: "Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost
narrative. It in no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity. What saves them from it is their
knowledge that legitimation can only spring from their own linguistic practice and communicational
interaction." LYOTARD, supra note 12, at 41.
57. Cf ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Postscript to the Second Edition, in AFrER VIRTUE 265-66 (2d ed.
1984) ("Morality which is no particular society's morality is to be found nowhere."); Winter, supra note
8, at 692-93 ("The tools with which we start must always be what we take as the best of the moral
traditions of our culture. But it is never the tools that do the job; morality, like art, is the work of the
imagination."); see also MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
FOR ETHICS 12 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
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The point is yet more stark with respect to slavery. If Richard Tuck is
correct, the concept of natural rights was first introduced by moral and
political theorists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in order to
justify the institution of slavery as it then flourished in Spain, Portugal, and
the Netherlands. 5 While this may seem counterintuitive, Tuck provides
a quite cogent explanation. Those within the civic humanist tradition
understood law as designed by humans for common utility. This position,
however, made it difficult to accept or justify slavery as a legal institution
because to do so meant assuming responsibility for it. Those in the natural
rights tradition, in contrast, were free to argue "that free men were free
(among other things) to enslave themselves ad libitum and unconditional-
ly. 160
Much the same paradox arises with respect to the usefulness and
consequences of depending upon transcendent normative frameworks for
resolving moral disagreement. Consensus is not the natural order of the
moral universe; the desire to hold "the mirror of critical objectivity to
meaning" is, as Robert Cover admonishes us, what leads to the "imperial
mode of world maintenance."'6' The potential price of such consensus,
moreover, is far too steep. If any moral system were so effective as to be
capable of preventing dissension, it would also run the much more serious
risk of cutting off moral development. For, in the absence of access to
some transcendent source, the plurality of values and practices characteris-
tically available within 62 or across cultural boundaries is an indispensable
source for moral adaptation and growth.63
This, I think, is the real lesson of Martha Nussbaum's second story.
Once we relinquish the notion of transcendent moral sources, we are
compelled to recognize that all of our putatively "universal" and "abstract"
benign offices of wife and mother."). Later the idea was to be given more scientific dress in Freud's
infamous "biology is destiny."
59. RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 49-57 (1979). Tuck notes: "An important
conclusion to which one is forcibly led is that most strong rights theories have in fact been explicitly
authoritarian rather than liberal. .... Selden's followers and Hobbes all openly endorsed such institutions
as slavery and the absolutist state." Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 49. Notions of inalienable rights developed later in response. See id. at 143-55.
61. See Cover, supra note 38, at 16 ("The sober imperial mode of world maintenance holds the
mirror of critical objectivity to meaning, imposes the discipline of institutional justice upon norms, and
places the constraint of peace on the void at which strong bonds cease."); see also id. at 68 ("We ought
to stop circumscribing the nomos; we ought to invite new worlds.").
62. See Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
965, 996-98 (1991) ("[T]he existence of slippage [in cultural learning and reproduction] will mean that
community is necessarily a relative phenomenon characterized by degrees of plurality and divergence.").
63. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 364-65 (1988); Margaret
Jane Radin and Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 1023, 1042 (1991) ("Slippage instigates the evolutionary rise, in sharply differentiating social
environments, of epistemic plurality."); cf. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues, supra note 4, at 262 ("A
traditional society, confronted with new technologies and sciences, and the conceptions that go with
them ... assesses the new item as a possible contributor to flourishing life, making it comprehensible
to itself, and incorporating elements that promise to solve problems of flourishing.").
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normative values-including the liberal Western conceptions of rights,
justice, equality, and personhood-are themselves the contingent, historical
products of particular traditions.' Thus, when Nussbaum's Third World
colleagues invoked these humanist values in their struggles against the
gender oppression of their traditional cultures, they were able to do so only
because such "abstract" values had been produced elsewhere through the
divergent processes of cultural development. In short, these liberal Western
conceptions would not have been available to them but for the multiplicity
of culturally relative, contingent moral values.65 The relativism of human
moral systems can thus be seen as an adaptive mechanism essential to any
human (which is to say fallible) normative enterprise. We have no reason
to want to bring our moral versatility to a stop, and much reason to carry
on with it.
The problem of values in a postmodern world has nothing to do with
nihilism because the problem of values is not, as we so habitually and
automatically assume, one of locating sources and deriving definitions.
That problem, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, is solely the product of
denial-denial of our finitude, our mortality, our humanity: "The adhesion
to an infinite positivity is a pseudonym for naked anguish-the pretention
to have crossed the negative and reached the other shore, to have
exhausted, totalled up, internalized death."66  Rather, the problem of
values is one of learning to rediscover their locus in our practices and
commitments. There is no other basis for our values than our own
committed actions.67 Without that ground, there are no foundations and
no values worth speaking of. Besides, as Merleau-Ponty observes, "[t]he
idea of a fortuitous humanity which has no cause already won is what gives
absolute value to our virtue.'68
64. "[Tlhe moral intuitions of the average middle-class member of a modem Western society are
contingent, fragile, precious creations, not the expression of something universally human." Richard
Rorty, Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein, 15 POL. THEORY 564, 579 n.28 (1987).
65. As Taylor reminds us, this "availability" is only a matter of logical conceivability unless those
values also make sense within the practices and forms of life of the receiving culture. See supra text
accompanying notes 20-27. In the case of India, China, and Mexico (the respective home countries of
these three philosophers), the penetration and extension of Western culture generally makes such liberal
Western values increasingly fitting.
66. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 29.
67. See Cover, supra note 38, at 45 ("'The transformation of interpretation into legal meaning begins
when someone accepts the demands of interpretation and, through the personal act of commitment,
affirms the position taken.").
68. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 1, at 219.
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